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A rapidly growing literature in industrial economics and regional economics uses data sets
of individual firms or regional firm creation rates to answer the central question: What
makes entrepreneurs? Which factors encourage some people to set up their own business
and create jobs, and what prevents potential entrepreneurs from doing so? This contribution
explores the determinants of regional differences in firm creation rates by using a new data
set of 4036 individual firms from Southwest Germany around 1900. Agglomeration effects
and earlier firm creations stimulate current firm creation. In addition, a small and medium
firm environment allows the formation of specific human capital – another favourable factor
for a dynamic firm creation process in some regions.1
Creating Firms for a New Century:
Determinants of Firm Creation around 1900
As many European countries entered the new millenium with large unemployment rates, the
study of firm creation processes is a flourishing field in economics today. In contrast to prior
decades in which policy makers believed in the effectiveness of Keynesian economic policy,
today’s common view is mainly the reverse. Hence decision makers emphasize the role of
efficient markets which could lead to higher firm creation rates and thereby to lower
unemployment rates. Obviously, if every unemployed person became an entrepreneur, the
problem would not exist any longer. Therefore, “entrepreneurship research” is an expanding
field which deals with the determinants of firm creation. Aside from direct employment
effects, high firm creation rates have a positive impact on the technical and organizational
change of economies because new firms are - on average - better equipped with the latest
technical and organizational knowledge. The structural change of the economy goes hand in
hand with high creation rates which tend to be accompanied with high rates of firm mortality,
as some studies argue (Reynolds/Storey/Westhead 1994). New firms can be found in sectors
with high profits, whereas firms which are likely to close down in the near future tend to be
located in unproductive sectors (Reynolds 1994, p. 430). In addition, some entrants expect to
replace less efficient incumbents, see Baldwin (1995).
The causes of regional differences in creation rates are especially subject to intense debates.
A series of studies partly coordinated by the OECD looked at those regional determinants
(Audretsch/Fritsch 1994, Audretsch/Vivarelli 1994, Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson 1994,
Reynolds/Storey/Westhead 1994, Gerlach/Wagner 1994, to name but a few). In their cross-
sectional analyses, Reynolds et al. (1994) and Fritsch (1994) emphasize the importance of
the so-called “seed bed” theory. This “seed-bed” consists of small and medium-sized firms in
which potential entrepreneurs can achieve a specific human capital: the close contact with the
entrepreneur provides opportunities to learn the important skills to run a firm. The weak-
nesses of some incumbent (i.e. already existing) firm’s leaders further encourage to set up
one’s own firm. Among other causes of regionally higher firm creation rates, agglomeration
effects features prominently: a higher concentration of industrial activity in one region leads
to positive externalities in the human capital formation process, to “thick” labor and inter-
mediary markets in which entrepreneurs can hire exactly the inputs they need. Apart from
those factors, we will also consider in the following variables that are related to cultural
factors and mentality. Max Weber has put forward the famous hypothesis that certain features
of protestantism are more condusive to entrepreneurial activity and modern economic growth.
Although Weber’s own theory is more complicated, some of his followers formulated a
simplified version saying that protestant regions and countries (such as the UK, USA, Nether-
lands, Switzerland) develop modern economic growth earlier than others. We will test this
simplified Weber thesis below. Still another influence on firm creation has been pointed out
by Gerlach and Wagner (1994): the intertemporal persistence of regional differences.
Previous firm creation might either stimulate current firm creation because of expected
profits being similar in both time periods, or because of a “bounded rationality” type of
perception that suggests to potential entrepreneurs that this might be the case.2
Occasionally, a period of enormous firm creation rates is mentioned in the literature – e.g.
the phase of rapid industrialization in Germany at the end of the 19th and the beginning of
the 20
th century. The time period around 1900 might have had a critical mass of firm creators,
thus it was possible to achieve substantial economic growth. One of the most important
questions in economic history is how such a critical mass developed from Germany’s agri-
cultural and craftsmen society of the 19
th century. This question is very relevant, because its
clarification can help to understand today’s issues and solve a part of the unemployment
problem.
Economic evidence from this time period has several important advantages for empirical
studies of industrial economics. Firm creation studies on the 1980s and 1990s often have to
rely on data from questionnaires that typically underly return selectivity. The relative impor-
tance of the different determinants of non-response is normally unclear. In contrast, our
historical samples contain almost all of the firms (given the definitions below). Secondly, the
variety of regional economic policy today makes it difficult to identify econometrically which
part of entrepreneurial behaviour is caused by these measures, and which part is caused by
other factors.1 On the other hand, opponents could argue that human behaviour of the 1980s
and 1990s might have greater similarities to the human behaviour of the early 21
st century
(that we want to understand and predict) than human behaviour around 1900. But recent
studies have shown that important aspects of the economic situation were actually more
similar around 1900 and around 2000: For example, international capital market integration
was at a similarly high level in those two periods, than it was in the meantime of the 1920s to
early 1980s (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Taylor 1996).
Almost in every country, there are dynamic regions with high rates of firm creation, on the
one hand, and less dynamic ones, on the other. In today’s Italy, for example, the Emilia-
Romagna developed a reputation for its many new small firms in the fashion industry.
California’s Silicon Valley is probably the best-known example of a region with a flourishing
high tech small firm sector and high creation rates. Regional research on firm creation
focuses on the characteristics that distinguish these dynamic regions from other ones that are
displaying less dynamism. Baden in 1900 was an area of economic growth, being in a way
representative for developing Germany: it had some regions that were dynamic with many
firm creations, whereas others were lagging behind. What exactly was Baden's economic
position within Germany? Was it a prosperous region, or a backwater of Germany? If the
latter were the case, one could imagine that many of the firm creations analysed later-on were
born out of sheer misery. Tax-based regional estimates of GDP per capita in 1913 suggest
that Baden takes a middle position within Germany: the Bezirke (Baden had 4 Bezirke)
Mannheim and Karlsruhe were 10% and 13% above the German average, Freiburg and
Konstanz were 13% and 18% below average (Frank 1994; Handbuch 1992). Interestingly,
rural and urban unskilled (nominal) wages were relatively high in Baden  (Table 1): The rural
wages of the four main regional units ranged from the 69
th to the 81th percentiles of German
wages, the urban wages were even relatively higher (the data refer to 1897, Central-Blatt,
Anhang zu Nr. 52 1897). Of course, nominal wages do not tell us much about living
                                                   
1  In addition, historical evidence has the great advantage that business secrets do not play
a large role –but this feature is not used in the present study. For example, tax
declarations are not secret after 80 years, and firm archives keep records of secret
decisions that today’s CEOs would not make accessible.3
standards, but regional cost-of-living estimates are difficult to obtain. We formed a very
rough regional consumer price index from rye flour and pork in the major German regions,
and found that prices in Baden were relatively high. The real wages in Baden ranged from the
47
th to the 65
th percentile. The high prices and wages might have been stimulated by high
population density and the demand for goods and labor in Switzerland and Upper Alsace, two
adjacent regions of Baden. Interestingly, human capital formation in Baden was already
around 1900 far above the German average (see also Fischer 1989).2 Three of the four major
regions were far above the median, Mannheim even reached the 83
rd percentile of German
patenting activity. This level of inventive activity was certainly promising for the future.
Parts of those regions might be compared with Silicon valley (especially the cities of Mann-
heim and Karlsruhe, see Borscheid 1976, Abelshauser 2002).
Recent research on firm creation has developed the strategy of counting the number of
created firms in a region and relating it to the regional population (or to the workforce), i.e.
confronting the creators with the non-creators. This creation rate (abbreviated CR) will be our
dependent variable. A helpful finding in this context was the fact that the overwhelming
majority of firm founders set up their business at their place of residence, as Fritsch (1994)
demonstrated.3 We will employ these methods for evaluating the firm creation record of the
late 19
th and early 20
th century in the South German state of Baden that had excellent
statistics and other advantages described below.
Sources for firm creation rates around 1900
Restricting the analysis to Baden is necessary because none of the other German states kept
records of all newly created firms by year of creation on a low level of regional aggregation.
But Baden has important additional advantages, making it an ideal test case: Most of its
industries were “footloose” industries: As almost no important natural resources were avail-
able (except the wood that gave rise to a small number of lumber firms), nearly all firms that
were created in Baden could theoretically have been created elsewhere, or anywhere within
this state. Another advantage of Baden is the concentration of human capital intensive
industries. This land is typical for the machine building and chemical industries that led to
Germany’s long-run success (for more details, see Baten 2001, p. 86). Therefore, it is
particularly interesting to study this region on the background of today’s human capital
intensive development. Finally, Baden is a good land to study because it has no clear core-
periphery structure, but many medium-sized cities. If France or the region around Berlin
would have been studied instead, we would have to deal with this core-periphery structure in
a special way.
As we want to connect the firm creation process with regional characteristics, we have to
choose a reasonable level of aggregation. An astonishing lot of information was published on
the 52 districts (Amtsbezirke), so this level of aggregation is attractive. However, the
                                                   
2  We measure this as the number of patents that were prolonged for ten years of more, in
order to meet the criticism against patents that often disappear soon.
3  This research strategy has considerable advantages compared with methods dealing
with groups of entrepreneurs only, because the large majority of people not setting up
businesses is taken into account.4
question arises whether these geographical units are not too large or too small. If the level of
aggregation would be too small, the place where potential creators are living and where they
create firms could be artificially separated. Too large regions on the other hand lead to small
numbers of cases and a possible averaging out of regional differences (for example, agglome-
ration effects). A generally accepted criterion is the size of labor market areas (Reynolds
1994). But we do not have enough information to determine the size of labor market areas by
cluster analysis or similar techniques. Instead, we will employ two levels of regional
aggregation in the following: In addition to the district level, we will also consider cities as
regional units. Other important features of firm creation data sets are the criteria they apply
with respect to minimum firm size and minimum survival time (Reynolds 1994, Solar 1997).
Many studies strive to restrict their data sets according to some criterion of influence: Fritsch
(1994) selected only firms that survived more than a year and had more than just one
employee. This has the advantage that firms with almost no impact on the regional economy
are disregarded. Our first data source are the establishment lists created by the factory
inspectors that record all establishments with 10 and more workers, 4036 in total, for 1895
and 1906. Firm creation rates are then calculated as the number of created firms per 10000
labor market participants. Our second data source is the number of all newly registered firm
creations in one year - we used the year 1896, because most of our explanatory variables refer
to 1895, so that choosing 1896 for the dependent variable avoids the problem of contempo-
raneous correlation. This source, recorded on a district level, also includes firms with 0-9
workers.
A methodological problem arises from the fact that the creation of branches [“works“ that are
not independent] does not reflect local or regional characteristics of the creator, because those
creations often take place far away from the entrepreneur’s place of residence. Fortunately,
we have been able to identify most of the branch creations in our data set.4 However, for the
first part of our analyses we adjust our mode of measurement to the studies reported above,
including both “companies“ and “works” to be able to draw comparisons with the previous
literature. In contrast to our historical data sets, those studies on the 1980s were faced with
enormous problems identifying branches, because this information was unavailable due to the
legal restriction of data protection (Datenschutz). For example, Fritsch (1994) had to include
all branches among his firms. He only excluded those firms with an initial size of 50 and
more workers, because he assumed that those were branches, since "newly created, indepen-
dent firms typically start small". We will definitely exclude branches (“works” that were not
independent) in the last part of the paper. We have to admit though that the results change
only modestly if branches are excluded (branches represent about 12.5% of the total stock of
firms).
Apart from the branch question, we will also adjust the specification of our regression to the
cited literature. For example, a logarithmic transformation will not be used in the first set of
regressions.
                                                   
4  Very small branches that were situated in the same street as the central establishment,
were not entered as separate data sets. Their number of workers was added to the main
establishment.5
Hypotheses
We begin with an income choice model in which the probability to create a firm in time
period t is dependent on the expected entrepreneurial income, and its opportunity costs, the
otherwise expected wage. We use the stylized fact that the largest share of new entrepreneurs
created firms in the place of their previous residence. This observation serves as a justifica-
tion to calculate their opportunity cost as being the wage they would have earned otherwise,
and not the foregone profit from not creating a firm elsewhere. This is a well-founded empi-
rical fact (Fritsch 1994, Audretsch/Vivarelli 1994), but still it is astonishing. Why is the
opportunity cost of creating a firm in region i not simply the cost of creating a firm in another
region? It seems as if personal networks help to reduce the costs (including psychological
costs) of creating a firm dramatically. It is also remarkable that some firm creators went to
foreign countries, before setting up a firm in the village next to which they were born. For
example, Franz Xaver Heine who was born in Voehrenbach in the Southern Blackwood went
to Russia for several years and visited France, Switzerland and England, before creating a
clock-producing firm in his small village of birth – and there were more cases of this kind
(Bender 1978).
Interestingly, the creation of a new branch of a firm is much more frequently done in an
alternative region: once firm creators did experience their ability to run an independent firm
successfully in their own place, they start to export this entrepreneurial activity into other
regions.6 But the original act of firm creation is most often done at the earlier place of resi-
dence, as previous questionaire and interview studies demonstrated. We also have to keep in
mind that the potential number of firm creators is enormously large in any region: there are
typically 2-4 firm creations per 10000 labor force annually, and less than one creation reaches
the level of 10 workers after 5-10 years. Therefore, what we are modelling (and later obser-
ving in most cases) is the decision of a previously salaried worker to switch from wage labor
to firm creation in his own community or district.7
                                                   
5  The literature on firm creations by industry in contrast does not use firm creations per
labor force (Audretsch and Fritsch 1994 called this the “labor market approach”), but
calculates the creation rate as the number of new firms per 100 existing firms, see Orr
(1974) and Geroski (1991).
6  Those other regions are selected according to favorable input costs (such as low
wages). In a separate analysis, we regressed the creation of branches on a variety of
explanatory variables and found that low wages are an important predictor for firm
creations (regressions not shown here).
7  Those people also typically do not run a firm part-time, parallel to continuing working
in a wage labor position.6
We aggregate the choice to create a firm over n inhabitants of a given region:
CRt = 1/n ∑ = − Π
n
i i i W f
1 *) * (   (1)
where
CRt  firm creation rate in year t in a given region
Πi*  expected profit of individual i (net, minus costs for coping with barriers plus
benefits from non-profit advantages
Wi* expected wage of individual i
The expected entrepreneurial income as well as the expected wage depends on a vector of
factors:
SYMBOL
Πi*  =  f(AGGLO_HUMCAP, SME_SEED, HISTORY, FCOST, OTHER, ε) (2)




HUMCAP: agglomeration externalities and human capital stock
SME_SEED: “seed-bed effect”: entrepreneurial human capital formation and network
externalities of small & medium enterprises
HISTORY the creation rate of the previous period might either proxy profit expectations
(because of costs and benefits not controlled with other variables), or learning
and imitation effects
FCOST the two main factor costs: costs of capital and labor
OTHER other promoting or preventing factors are policy issues (such as taxation and
infrastructure investments, touristic specialisation (to be explained below),
and mentality-related variables
WAGE current wage level
UNEMP unemployment rate (not very important for the period under study).
We will comment on those factors and their proxies in greater detail below.7
Hypothesis 1: Agglomeration and human capital effects
Based partly on Marshall's finding that agglomeration effects result from external increasing
returns in production and especially the development of thicker input or factor markets,
notably for labor, Krugman (1991) suggested a model to explain the uneven economic growth
of regions. Firm creation does not directly appear in his model, but he focuses on the growth
of industrial labor force agglomerations. This growth of the labor force takes place partly by
the growth of existing firms and partly by creation of new firms.
Krugman does not model entrepreneurial incomes, land rents etc, his main element of model
closure is the adjustment of real and nominal wages in different regions: Increasing returns to
scale at the firm level lead to cheaper products and increase the regional real wages. Those
attract workers from low wage regions, in turn increasing the share of the total industrial
labor force living in this agglomerated region, and a still higher number of products will be
produced there. Opposed to this force promoting agglomeration stand centrifugal transpor-
tation cost (that work against agglomerations: the higher those are, the less agglomerated is
the resulting equilibrium) and nominal wage increases (from the firms' perspective).
In our study, we will employ the share of the industrial and service (i.e., nonfarm) sector
labor force in the region as a proxy for agglomeration effects, to keep it close to Krugman’s
model. This variable captures the strong migration movements to the emerging centres of
industry. The previous literature has used a variety of indicators to measure agglomeration
effects. Apart from obvious variables such as population density, the share of people aged 25-
44 is often considered  (Table 2, which is adapted from Reynolds/Storey/Westhead 1994, p.
451). It has been argued that where the members of these age group migrate, a strong
urbanity should probably exist (even if population density is not necessarily highest, as in the
Los Angeles region, for example, see Reynolds et al., 1994). Agglomeration and human
capital tend to be highly correlated and the independent effect of each component is difficult
to isolate in regression analyses. Surprisingly, both variables have been insignificant in many
country studies. Only the share of managers has been significant in the Anglo-Saxon cases.
For Ireland and the USA the coefficient on population density turns out to be negative, maybe
because industrial firms choose their location outside of the cities (even if they remain often
close to the metropolises. Results of agglomeration effects therefore depend on the level of
geographic aggregation). For Germany, Italy, and the UK the coefficients have been
significantly positive.
Hypothesis 2: “Seed-bed” effect: SME environment and regional specialization
Are firm creations promoted more by large firms (supplier relations) or small firm environ-
ments (“seed-beds”). A large firm in one region might mean good possibilities for potential
entrepreneurs to set up new firms supplying parts and auxiliary services. For example, the
firm creation activity in the Munich area has been attributed to the move of the Siemens
company from Berlin to Munich after World War II. On the other hand, a high percentage of
the labor force working in small firms has been hypothesized to have a positive influence on
the propensity to create firms. The reasoning behind this latter hypothesis, also called “seed
bed theory”, is the empirically observed fact that many firm creators work in small firms8
before setting up their own business. Because small firms employ a less specialized manage-
ment, their managers are responsible for a broad range of activities and therefore achieve a
wide range of entrepreneurial human capital. In contrast, managers in large firms tend to be
highly specialized, lacking the broad knowledge how to run a whole firm. Other factors that
motivate managers and technically skilled persons from small firms to set up their own busi-
ness is the lower salary in small firms and the higher probability of firm failure. (On the wage
differential by firm size, see Gerlach/Schmidt, 1990. On high failure rates of small firms, see
Storey et al., 1987). The same managers in large firms would have better career possibilities
and would less often take an own business into consideration. So we have opposing views
here, making it fascinating to test the two hypotheses empirically: Do Siemens and other
large firms stimulate firm creation, or does a high share of SME employees lead to high
creation activity?
This seed-bed factor is measured as the share of employees in small and medium sized enter-
prises (in the following also called “SME factor”). In studies on the 1980s firm creation rates,
this variable showed a positively significant relationship with the creation rates in six count-
ries (Table 2). Hence the variable SME plays a crucial role in the forthcoming analysis.
Fritsch (1994) supported this view by showing that the share of skilled workers in small firms
has an even more systematic impact. (Fritsch 1994, Table 4, p. 32/33).8 Some papers focus on
the role of regional spezialization. In “industrial districts” new and small firms are easily able
to assess the market and their potential profit opportunities (Sabel/Zeitlin, 1997). Transaction
costs are supposed to be lower and knowledge is transferred more efficiently. Ex ante the
probability of failure declines. The staff in those enterprises are more likely to gain an over-
view of potential market niches and to set up their own firms.
Hypothesis 3: History: “Learning by example” and other autocorrelated effects
Firm creations in the previous period might have taken place, because the profit opportunities
were favorable – apart from the factor costs and and other promoting or preventing variables
that we control for. Another mechanism how past creations can influence current firm
formation rates is imitative behaviour (reflecting perhaps bounded rationality behaviour).
Thirdly, technological achievements of individual entrepreneurs could create knowledge
externalities for following entrepreneurs. This can be conceptualized as a learning curve with
limited knowledge transfer possibilities. The duration of firm activity is plotted on the x axis
against downward sloping short-run average cost on the y-axis. If no externalities existed,
each firm would have to start at the highest point of this learning curve, and with experience
gradually move down to lower average cost levels. However, if knowledge transfers are
possible, new firms can start at a point further to the right, at a lower average cost level.9
                                                   
8  However, Audretsch and Fritsch (1995) differentiated between manufacturing and
services industries and they found that the predominance of small firms had no effect
on the rate of manufacturing start-ups, presumably because scale economies were much
more relevant in manufacturing. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this hint.
9  This might also play a role for the literature on path dependence, see, for example,
Puffert (2002).9
Technology is broadly defined here including all other knowledge components the lack of
which might keep somebody from creating a firm in spite of higher expected income: How to
live with higher risks, how to deal with employees, with criminality, the need to declare
taxes, and similar issues. We test this argument in the following by taking into account the
firm creation rates of the past. In other words, the previous firm creation serves as a proxy for
the “learning by example” effects, because potential entrepreneurs can learn much a firm
creation in the previous period.
Hypothesis 4: Main factor costs: Capital and wage costs
One of the first problems potential entrepreneurs are faced with is the access to capital. A
frequent reason for firm mortality is illiquidity during the first years of the firm’s life cycle.
Very few firm creators receive their whole initial capital stock from banks, and if they do, the
interest rates are extremely high (in the absence of exogenous wealth). Typically, a large
share of initial capital stems from their own savings, or it is borrowed from relatives and
friends. Houses and land often serve as securities for the remaining sum. Therefore many
contributions in this field directly employ the price of houses in a region or the share of
owner-occupied apartments as indicator for capital availability. However, most of these
indicators remain insignificant in the six studies (Table 2); only the price of houses is
significantly positive in the U.S. (although it might as well proxy other factors).
As a proxy for the local access to capital we employ the (money) capital tax per population.
This tax was levied on capital that is not invested in the owner's firm. This variable is a good
proxy for the local availability of capita.
Labor costs are the second main item in the entrepreneurial calculation. Low wages might
encourage potential entrepreneurs, both because of modest explicit labor costs and low
opportunity costs. However, wages are sometimes proxies for human capital aspects that are
difficult to measure with schooling and similar variables. This fact leaves us with a slightly
ambiguous expectation about the impact of wages on creation propensity. We proxy this
variable with the unskilled day-labourer’s wage.
Other Hypotheses
Some additional factors are considered by research on creation activity in the 1980s, but
those turned out to be of minor importance or ambiguous impact in previous empirical studies
(regional economic policy, unemployment), or they might be endogenous from a microeco-
nomic point of view (demand growth). In our study, we will consider additional factors such
as regional taxation (Hallerberg 1995), railway infrastructure, and tourist orientation:
Regional taxation is an obvious cost factor for firm creations. We measure it with a dummy
variable that is one if the taxation by the local communities is higher than average. Railway
infrastructure reduces costs for intermediaries, energy, and for the distribution of final10
products. We measure it as being one if a district lies on a main railway line. Tourist orienta-
tion is an interesting variable, because one would expect that tourist regions provided ample
opportunities for creating a flood of firms: hotels, restaurants, small pensions, and all kinds of
services from taxis to massage.10 On the other hand, tourism is an industry that exists symbio-
tically with agriculture, and suffers easily from negative externalities of industrial production:
Who would love to sleep in a hotel close to a chemical plant? Who would want to step out of
a casino (such as the one in Baden-Baden) and hear the machinery noise of a steel processing
firm? In regions that specialized in the tourism industry around 1900, we could also expect
lower rates of firm creation in the industrial sector. Cities like Freiburg or Heidelberg which
lived from tourism and the immigration of rich retired people would not tolerate noisy
establishments of the metal processing industry. Also in the region of Muellheim, many
people earned their living from tourists who were attracted by the mineral springs. We
measure this factor with the employment share in tourism.11
Results at the “district” level of aggregation
Before considering causal models, we will first take a closer look at the dependent variable:
the geographical differences of firm creation rates in Baden around 1900 are shown in map 1.
Dark areas represent higher creation rates. A strong activity was concentrated in the larger
cities of Mannheim, Heidelberg, Freiburg and Pforzheim, even though other big cities such as
Karlsruhe and Konstanz had only moderate rates. Less urbanized regions with a strong
creation activity were Wiesloch, Bruchsal/Eppingen, and Lahr/Ettenheim, where particularly
many tobacco processing firms settled (Boelcke 1987). Triberg and Villingen, centres of
German clock manufacturing, were also above average. Clearly less activity was visible in
the Northeast (except Buchen/Wertheim), and the Southeast (except Messkirch). Some parts
of the Southwest (Muellheim, Staufen) and the central part (Baden, Rastatt) have surprisingly
low rates: one would expect the good transport facilities of those regions to have created a
more dynamic regional economy. Because we find below that urban agglomeration implies
higher creation rates, the residuals were calculated from a regression of firm creation rates on
                                                   
10  I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
11  The negative influence of tourism on firm creation that we will find below was not
caused by underreporting of newly created firms in the tourism sector (we define this
sector as: “hotels, restaurants, and other recreative business”. We cannot separate out
restaurants that mainly addressed local people). In some districts, the number of firm
creations in tourism was actually high – especially in Freiburg (205 new firms in this
sector 1896 of 432 in total) and Heidelberg, in other cities is was low: Mannheim had 9
new “recreative firms” among 645 total newly created firms (those numbers do not
apply a minimum survival criterion). The effect is driven by the low overall creation
rates in most of the tourist-oriented districts (Baden-Baden, Muellheim, Black Forest
districts).11
the agglomeration indicator.13 Those residuals – which can be thought of as the firm creation
rates after the agglomeration factor has been controlled for – are shown in map 2. A whole
area of lower creation propensity than expected from the agglomeration factor becomes
visible in the Southwest, around Schopfheim and Schoenau. This is a traditional textile
region, with relatively large firms. This would support the notion of a low share of SME
tending to suppress creation activity. Other lower-than-expected rates remain in Baden-Baden
and Karlsruhe, whereas the Northeast and Southeast is closer to the average now.
One potential problem of regional analysis could be spatial autocorrelation: if adjacent
regions are either infected by high creation rates of their neighbours (positive spatial
autocorrelation), or if they are negatively affected, spatial autocorrelation might make the
estimates inefficient.14 However, the maps do indicate neither positive nor negative
autocorrelation. There are several regions of high and low creation activities spread over
the country, and only a limited number of adjacent regions that have both high (or low)
values (if there would be no clusters at all, we would have negative autocorrelation).15
We therefore proceed to analyze the determinants of regional creation rates in a straight-
forward regression model (before checking some other possible problems). To make results
comparable to those of the OECD studies cited in Table 2. We use BETA coefficients instead
of non-standardized coefficients. The proportion of SME (employees in small and medium
sized enterprises) turns out to be significant also in the historical time period (Table 3, col. 2).
One might conclude that this aspect of the generation process of entrepreneurs around 1900
was similar to the one that Fritsch (1994) and Audretsch/Fritsch (1994) predicted for the
western part of Germany today (and the OECD-coordinated studies for other countries).
However, there were also differences. The share of population working in industry and
services regions (or proxy for industrial agglomeration) shows the expected positive impact
on the creation rate of firms in Baden around 1900, but not for the 1980s. The access to
capital was clearly positive for this historical sample, including all samples (column 2), and
highly significant. Finally, a regional specialization towards tourism has a robust, negative
effect on firm creation in the industrial sector. The BETA coefficients indicate that the SME
and agglomeration factors were of slightly smaller importance compared with the tourism and
capital access factor.
We will analyze the robustness of our findings by using our second source, the creation rates
based on data of newly opened firms in 1897-1905. In contrast to the estimations above
which included all firms, we now include those that expanded to 10 and more employees in
1906 (Table 3, Column 3 to 5). This has the advantage that we can measure firm creations
that had a certain degree of success and employment impact in the medium run. In general,
the same coefficients are significant (except capital access) with the expected signs (Column
                                                   
13  The percentage of non-agricultural occupations.
14  For example, the unlikely case that all entrepreneurs are drawn into one regional centre
would lead to negative spatial autocorrelation.
15  We did not perform formal tests for autocorrelation, because experts warned us that the
long-stretched geographical nature of Baden might provide inconclusive results.12
3).16 The local feasibility of capital (proxied with available money capital that was subject to
the money capital tax, per capita) shows a positive impact on the creation rates of all
industrial firms, including the very small ones (Column 2). However, concentrating on large
firms (Column 3-4), the feasibility of capital turns out to be insignificant (just as in Fritsch
1994). It is likely that this difference between small and large firms can be explained by their
different mode of finance: While small firms depended on capital from families and friends,
larger and rapidly growing firms might have had better access to nationwide sources of
financing. In the regression of those firms' creation rates the BETA coefficient of industrial
agglomeration is larger than the other BETAs, it might be slightly more important for this
group of entries.
We experimented with two human capital proxies, the number of patents per capita and the
number of students at industrial schools per capita (not shown in the table, see Baten 2001,
pp. 137). We found that both the agglomeration variable and the human capital proxies had
independent (positive) effects. The elasticities of patents was 0.26-0.38, and the ones of
students of technical schools was 0.18-0.28. The effect of industrial agglomeration on firm
creation declined by about 30%, if the human capital variables were included, but remained
significant and larger than the human capital effect. We therefore conclude that there was
both an agglomeration and an human capital effect that influences the firm creation rate
positively.
Column 4 includes a dummy variable for districts that were connected to the main railway
lines. The insignificant coefficient suggests that it did not have a decisive impact, after
controlling for agglomeration. The coefficients for agglomeration (industry and services
population), SME structure, and tourism are robust to these changes in specification.
While taxation by the state was homogenous in Baden, the cities and villages also had the
right to tax their inhabitants, and those taxes were not negligible compared with state taxes
(Voigtel 1903). We therefore include a dummy variable in column 5 that is 1 for those
districts in which the majority of communes levied more than a 1 percent tax on industrial
income. However, this coefficient is insignificant and remains so in other specifications. This
might be explained by the fact that taxes in general were considerably lower than they are
today, so that tax exemption on a local level might have played only a minor role compared
with the other locational determinants. We also assessed the potential influence of wages and
firm mortality and found it insignificant (Table 3, Column 4 and 5).17
                                                   
16  It does not matter whether we proxy the agglomeration effect by the employment share
in industry and services or by population density. These variables are highly correlated
(correlation coefficient of 0.74, p=0.00), and including either of these variables to the
model leads to similar outcomes.
17  We assumed that natural firm mortality, for example caused by the death of an
entrepreneur, is similar across regions. We are interested in differences of firm
mortality that might be caused by regional characteristics and developments. Both
positive and negative influences on firm creation could be hypothesized: if a high share
of firms goes bankrupt, potential firm creators can be discouraged. On the other hand, a
high firm mortality could open many possibilities for new firms to enter the market.13
When testing causal models with cross-sectional data, one natural question is whether we
were able to include all important variables, or whether there might be omitted variable bias -
arising often from unobserved regional heterogeneity. In those cases, a common strategy is to
use panel data and fixed effects estimation that is more robust against unobserved heteroge-
neity. In the previous literature on firm creation, so far only Gerlach and Wagner (1994) have
approached this problem by comparing the simple regression specification with alternative
estimates obtained by including regional fixed-effects dummies. Under this specification, the
SME factor lost its statistical significance in their sample of Lower Saxonian firms of the
1980s (whereas the fixed effect dummies were significant). However, the size of the coeffi-
cients did not decline very much (and remained economically meaningful). This effect often
appears if a large number of new variables are entered into the regression model, because the
amount of variance in the dependent variable has to be “shared” by more explanatory
variables. We interpret this result as an indication that there was actually an independent
effect both of SME and of regional fixed effects in the Lower Saxonian sample. In our case,
we are not able to construct a panel data set to estimate a model with regional fixed effects,
but the next best thing to do is to add a set of regional variables that might capture some
unobserved heterogeneity for slightly larger regions. We use the separation of Baden into 11
Kreise.18 We find that the three core variables remain significant, even if we control for
unobserved regional heterogeneity (column 5 in Table 3). We have deviated here from the
OECD specification and instead used natural logarithms of all variables so that we can
interpret the coefficients as elasticities.19 It turns out that al the core elasticities are also
economically meaningful: A 1% higher share of SME employment leads to a 0.9% increase
in firm creation. The same marginal change in agglomeration almost doubles new firm entry.
Did Weber's "Protestant entrepreneur" prevail in Baden?
Many contemporaries of our firm creators and among the following generations were
fascinated by Max Weber's theory of the religious influence on entrepreneurship. Weber
(1924) hypothesized that religion had an exogenous influence that led Protestants and
especially Calvinists to play an important role in the fundamental economic upswing since
the 16th century. He based his argument on the leading role of English, Scottish, Swiss,
Dutch and U.S. Protestants during the industrial and 'industrious' revolutions (de Vries 1994).
Even in predominantly Catholic countries and regions, the Protestants had a higher probabi-
lity of being entrepreneurs, for example in France, Germany (especially in the Rhineland),
and Hungary. Weber hypothesized that the human capital formation that stemmed from the
Protestant insistence in (bible) reading ability played a role. Another factor was the higher
propensity to save, because consumption was almost equaled to sin and Protestants could not
remove sins by confession. Finally the Calvinists developed the idea that God indicated
already on earth those persons who led a holy life by allowing them relatively high wealth.
This led Calvinists in Weber's view to a life of permanent work, trying to create a self-ful-
filling prophecy. His international comparisons have been criticised because of the small
                                                   
18  Instead of a fixed effects estimation based on the 52 districts that would not be possible
with a pure cross-section
19  Changing the specification has the advantage that we can assess the robustness of the
model against those changes. However, columns 2-4 would not change much under this
different specification.14
number of cases and the existence of counter-examples such as Northern Italy and Belgium,
where Catholic societies developed a capitalistic spirit. Weber defended his position by
refering to contemporary studies on Bavaria, Baden, and Hungary that reported a higher
propensity of Protestant students in those confessionally mixed countries to visit technical
and business colleges, while their Catholic colleagues preferred humanistic colleges that put
greater emphasis on religion and ancient languages. According to studies of this type,
Catholic craftsmen also tended to remain in their traditional fields, while a higher proportion
of Protestant craftsmen moved into the factories and formed a worker aristocracy there. I
would follow Weber's critics in that he did not separate carefully enough the effects of
religion and minority status, which, given a certain level of human capital, tends to increase
the propensity to set up businesses - partly because dependent employment is more often
restricted.
Baden offers an opportunity to test this hypothesis, as the share of Protestants differed
considerably among regions. We reformulate Weber's argument into a simplified version of
his hypothesis: Did a higher share of Protestants lead to a higher firm creation rate? We
notice indeed a significantly positive coefficient of this variable (Table 4, Column 1).
However, if we control for the other variables that we found to influence firm creation rates,
the significance of Protestantism disappears (Table 4, col. 3). This insignificance is not
caused by strong multicollinearity, none of the other regressors is highly correlated (all
correlation coefficients less than 0.5). The modest collinearity is sufficient to let the
Protestant variable become insignificant. Hence, we reject this simplified version of Weber's
hypothesis for the case of Baden.
Another religious minority in Baden was the Jews. Weber downplayed the impact of this
minority - in contrast to Sombart - although his opinion was based only on his theorizing
about the economic effect of religious beliefs, not on empirical research (Bischoff 1944). The
popular opinion in late 19th and early 20th century that the trading sector contributed little to
overall economic growth might have added to this negative judgement, as the Jews were
particularly specialized in this field (a result of medieval laws that constrained their economic
activities). In our regression analysis, the percentage of Jewish population has a significant
positive effect on the firm creation rate in industry (Table 4, Column 2). However, in contrast
to the Protestant variable, this influence remains weakly significant after controlling for the
other factors such as agglomeration, tourism etc. (Table 3, Column 3). The BETA coefficient
is somewhat lower though. This finding also contradicts both Weber's argument and it dis-
proves anti-semitic beliefs of the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries. In contrast, our finding
indicates a positive (although weak) influence of a Jewish minority on the firm creation
process, whereas Protestant presence does not explain regional differences.
Potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables
Agglomeration can result in higher firm creation rates, but Krugman’s model also predicts
that an expansion in the number of firms attracts additional workers, leading in turn to
increasing agglomeration. Reverse causation or bi-directional "repercussion" effect can both
be imagined. Another variable that we assumed to be exogenous in previous regressions is
the SME enviroment. The exogeneity of this variable, however, has also not yet been15
systematically analyzed, neither theoretically nor empirically. Theoretically, several
interpretations of an endogenous SME factor can be thought of. A high rate of creation of a
given region in the past can lead to a high percentage of small and medium sized firms,
because those newly created firms have not fully grown yet. In other, less dynamic regions,
older firms will have had a longer time span to grow, causing their share of employment to be
large. One possibility to test which direction of causality is more important would be to
perform Granger causality tests, but suitable annual data are not available (in addition,
Granger "causality" is mainly a measure for precedence).
We will use two stage least square (abbreviated 2SLS from now) estimation techniques to test
for endogeneity of the agglomeration and SME variables, and to arrive at unbiased estimates
if the endogeneity hypothesis should be confirmed. In order to run a 2SLS regression, instru-
mental variables are required that need to be correlated with the potentially endogenous
variables, but not with the ultimate dependent variable (the creation rate in our case). They
should also not be causally linked with the dependent variable, except through the potentially
endogenous variable. Now, what could be proxies (instruments) of the SME environment that
are not correlated with firm creation? One characteristic of small firms in Baden around 1900
was that they used much less steam power than large firms. We therefore use the inverse of
the number of steam engines per employment as an instrument for the SME environment. By
similar considerations, we use the fertility rate as an instrument for agglomeration.20 Both
instruments are significantly correlated in the order or 0.40 to 0.50 with their respective
potentially endogenous variables , but they are not significantly correlated with regional
creation rates. As a result of the 2SLS estimation, agglomeration and tourist orientation
remain significant, the agglomeration coefficient even gains in size (Table 5. Column 1). The
SME variable becomes statistically insignificant, but its coefficient remains economically
meaningful with an elasticity of 0.85: Even if the influence of this variable might be less
systematic (there is more variation around the regression line) than we thought before, its
economic importance is still visible.
Are those results significantly different from an OLS regression? 21 The Hausman test is a
tool to compare whether the two estimation techniques result in such a difference. In exactly
the same specification as we did our 2SLS, we performed an OLS estimate, compared the
differences of the individual coefficients and the constant, and calculated the Hausman test.
In this case, the p-value of the Hausman test is 0.89. Thus the null hypothesis that differences
in coefficients are not systematic cannot be rejected, and the OLS estimation with its fully
efficient estimates is actually preferred.
                                                   
20  Thanks to Stefan Klasen for suggesting this instrument at the German Clio conference.
21  One could, in principle, construct firm creation rates, SME, and agglomeration
variables for three points in time. However, the variation over time would not be useful
and sufficient for a fixed effects analysis due to large measurement error. The exercise
is only helpful to increase the number of observations. We actually experimented with
this panel data set with 3 periods and 52 cross-sectional units. Although the data set
was problematic to interpret, Hausman-Wu tests of endogeneity (values of –1.50 and
0.52 for agglomeration and SME respectively) confirmed the finding of Table 5 that the
SME and agglomeration variables were in fact exogenous, whereas the firm creation
variable was endogenous (Baten 2001, pp. 104-108).16
In this context, it is also interesting to introduce a lagged dependent variable. The creation
rate of the previous period might proxy expected profits and a potential imitation impact.
Moreover, we want to consider whether the explanatory variables become insignificant once
this variable is added to the model. Regressions on the lagged creation rates indicate that
history does matter indeed (Table 5, Column 3). We regressed the creation rates of
1897-1905 on the creation rates in 1874-96 (column 2). This creation rate of the most recent
past is always highly significant and explains a high share of the variation in the dependent
variable.22
We also wanted to check how sensitive our models might react to including or excluding
branch creations, and using the "city" level of regional aggregation.23 As we are able to
distinguish independent firm creations from new branches, we excluded the latter in Table 5.
As a result, the influence of the ‘seed-bed effect’ of regions with many small firms remains
significant (Column 2 and 3). A 10 percent increase in the variable SME leads to 6.4 % more
firm creations. A tourist specialization clearly dampens creation activity. The agglomeration
variable loses its statistical significance with this sample of firm creations in cities, but the
coefficient remains economically meaningful. This result is relatively robust. However, the
lagged dependent variable has an important influence among cities, too. An interpretation of
this variable could be the "learning by example" (or imitation) effect described above, with
high firm creation rates in period t-1 directly impacting on creation in year t, because
potential firm creators could obtain knowledge by discussing the experience of those who set
                                                   
22  In the previous regressions we kept the specification that the studies coordinated by the
OECD used (see Reynolds et al. 1994) to make our estimates comparable, using OLS
without transformations and including branch locations. But rates such as the firm
creation rate are often characterised by skewed distributions. Checking the histogram
and several skewness measures, we found the creation rate indeed to be skewed to the
right. The same is true for our independent variables. We therefore employ a
logarithmic transformation that has also the advantage of allowing the coefficients to be
interpreted as elasticities. Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality tests indicated normally
distributed residuals, so the logarithmic specification allows efficient estimation and
hypothesis testing.
23  We also use the data on the 47 cities of Baden (with 2000+ inhabitants) to do further
sensitivity checks. The differences between firm creation rates in those cities also
turned out to be significantly influenced by the share of small and medium sized
enterprises (Table 4, column 1). The significance of the coefficients indicates that the
similar result for districts in the regressions above was probably not caused by casual
interaction between the agglomeration and the SME factor. Only 8% of variation is
explained, but after adding the tourism variable the R2 increases to a considerable 31%,
see www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/wwl/baten_greb_table_cities.htm. Even if we have
chosen cities to obtain more homogeneous geographical units, their degree of
agglomeration is not completely the same, of course. There are some large cities such
as Mannheim, Heidelberg, Freiburg and Karlsruhe on the one hand and small towns
that mainly administered the surrounding region. We therefore test and find that a rural
surrounding had a negative effect on the firm creation rate (Column 2-4). If the SME
factor is considered alone, its determination coefficient rises considerably if only the
larger cities (with 5000+ inhabitants) are included in the data set.17
up a business a few years ago. The success of those previous firm creators might have a
motivating impact. We also included firm mortality here and found it insignificant.24
Finally, did the industry structure or age play a role? Audretsch and Fritsch (1999) found a
strong variability of entry determinants across industries. We will not perform an analysis
industry by industry here, but rather consider whether adding the shares of the most important
industries to the model makes the other variables insignificant: one could imagine that some
districts had creation intensive industries and others did not. However, including the shares of
the most important industries did not change the results significantly (Table 5, column 4; see
also Baten 2001, p. 140). In addition, we found the same non-significant results for the
possible influence of age structure of the firms (results not shown, ibid.).
Conclusion
This paper reviewed a rapidly growing literature in industrial economics and regional econo-
mics that uses regional firm creation rates to answer the central question in entrepreneurship
research: What makes entrepreneurs? Which factors encourage some people to set up their
own business and create jobs, and what prevents potential entrepreneurs from doing so? Most
contributions in economics that consider firm creations of the recent past suffer from severe
data constraints. This is clearly a field in which economic history can provide important
insights: Governmental supervision lists of firms before WWI were used in this contribution
to reveal aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour that can only be investigated by historical
economists.
In particular, Krugman's (1991) agglomeration theory and Audretsch and Fritsch's (1994)
'seed bed' theory of a beneficial SME environment have been tested and confirmed. In
addition, a significant autoregressive term suggested that other factors are at work, perhaps a
'learning from example' effect: If your neighbour created a successful firm in the past, you are
also more inclined to do so. The capital access hypothesis was only partly confirmed for the
regional level; its proxy was significant only for the small firms. In contrast, nominal wages,
taxes, and railway infrastructure did not influence firm creation rates significantly.
Coming back to the question we posed in the introduction: What does this mean for today’s
economic policy that attempts to reduce unemployment? It is unnecessary to mention that an
economic policy decision should not be made relying on a historical data set alone. However,
economic history can provide additional evidence and additional ideas for today's economic
policy. A dynamic firm entry process is not the only determinant of job creation, but it is
certainly one of the important preconditions. Looking from this perspective, we formulate
five suggestions for today's economic policy:
(1) The frequently applied policy to keep large firms alive with subsidies (such as the
Holtzmann AG in Germany a few years ago) seems most dubious – not only because
                                                   
24  The coefficient of the mortality variable is positive (column 3). However, when the
autoregressive effect of the past firm creation rate is controlled for, the significance is
lost.18
subsidies always lead to distortions and disadvantage other firms, but also because of the
detrimental impact on the firm creation process that was demonstrated in this article.
(2) We also found that capital access is critical only to smaller start-up firms. However,
today's new-firm capital-support programs have a bias in favour of very ambitious start-
ups that do not start very small, but need much capital. This is caused by the economics
of bureaucracies that are better able to monitor a few large projects rather than many
small ones. But with the increasing possibilities of computer technology, this limitation
should be overcome and instead capital subsidies – if they are given at all – be provided
to the very small start-up firms.
(3)  The importance of agglomeration effects casts doubts on the policy to artificially
subsidize rural regions. Although there are certainly benefits that might or might not
outweigh the costs, the overall cost-benefir analysis should also take into account the
detrimental impact on the firm creation process.
(4)  The importance of minorities to create firms (that we found for the Jewish minority)
suggests that immigration policies of the EU countries should be more focussed on
entrepreunerial groups, as Canada does already for some time.
(5)  The "learning by example", or imitation, process that we found to be strong poses
challenges to school and university teachers, movie makers, the press and similar
institutions to inform better about stories of firm creators. Especially if they are closely
related to their respective audiences, such story-telling could encourage job-creation in
new firms. This effect suggests that there are psychological forces driving the decision to
set up one's own firm and to create jobs that are linked to regional or family
identification and imitation patterns and that could be used to fight the economic
problems of unemployment.19
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Freiburg 81 97 65 62
Karlsruhe 75 86 56 74
Mannheim 73 86 49 83
Konstanz 69 70 47 32
All data are first expressed as ranks for the 76 (urban nom. wage), 77 (rural nom&real wage) und 78
(patents) (Regierungs-)bezirke for which we had data, then they are expressed as percentiles
(rounded).
"Rural wage" and "Urban wage" are nominal wages. Patenting activity refers to 1897-1905. Source:
Hohenheim/Tübingen database on influential patents, thanks to Jochen Streb and Shuxi Yin for letting
me use this information.23
Table 2: Results of the regression for today: determinants of the firm creation rates in
industry in the late 1980s
Country/Regression Germany Ireland Italy Sweden UK USA
Demand
δPop./Immigration 0 - + + + +
δGDP 0 + 000-
Agglomeration
%Age 25-44 0 0 -
Pop. density + - +0+ -






Income of households 0 0
%Owner-occupied houses 0 00000
House prices 0 0 0 +
SME/Specialization
%employed in SME + + + + + +
Specialization 0 0 +0
Policy
%Socialist. Voters 0 + -
Communal expenditures 0 0 0
Aid programs + 000
N7 4 2 7 8 48 06 4 3 9 2
Adj. R2 0.51 0.76 0.58 0.37 0.70 0.62
Notes: + positively significant; - negatively significant; 0 insignificant. Shaded are explanatory
variables that are significant at the 0.10-level. Empty space: variables not included in the regression.
All regression are OLS without transformation. Source: Reynolds/Storey/Westhead (1994).24
Table 3: Five Regressions of firm creation rates around 1900 (districts of Baden) and in the









Larger firms (10+ workers 1906)
b) Period 1986-89 1896 1897-1905 1897-1905 1897-1905


















































NO NO NO NO YES
Adj. R2 0.65 0.82 0.36 0.37 0.44
N8 4 5 25 25 24 7
The constant is not given in the table because of using BETA coefficients, except in column 5, in
which elasticities are reported (all variables in logs). No WLS performed, except col. 2 and 5 (with
population 1895). Col. 1: t-values in parentheses. Col 2-5: p-values in parentheses. Shading indicates
significance at the 0.10-level.
Dependent variable: Col. 1: Germany – new firms 1986-89, which set up with 1-50 employees and
survived at least 2 years (per employed for 84 western German regions); source: Fritsch, 1994. Col. 2:
Baden – All new firms 1896 per population; source: Statistical Yearbook Baden 29 (1897/98), p. 160-
163. Col. 3-5: Firm creations 1897-1905 (per number of employed in 1895), which have had 10 or
more employees in 1906; source: Verzeichnis (1895, 1906).
SME: Baden 1897-1906: Share of employees in firms with less than 100 employed, for Germany
1986-89 the threshold value is 200 employees. Access to capital: Baden: Kapitalrentensteuerkapital
in 1000 Mark per head, for 1896. (Source: Statistical Yearbook Baden 29, 1898), pp. 462-463:
Germany: “Share of owner-occupied housing as an indicator of loan capital availability”, compare
Fritsch (1994), p. 30f. Tourism: Share of persons employed in “Beherbergung und Erquickung”
(housing and refreshment) in 1895 to the total number of employees in industry (Source: Statistical25
Yearbook Baden 29 (1898), p. 158f. Railway equals 1, if the district included at least one station of
the main line, see “Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg”, Blatt X.4. Nominal wages in Mark
refer to both male and female unskilled workers in for 1898. Regionally differentiated wages for other
occupations are not available. Firm Mortality: Share of firms with 10+ workers in 1895 that did not
survive until 1906.26


























High taxation - -
-1.09
(0.77)
Adj. R2 0.11 0.07 0.48
N5 2 5 2 5 2
All regressions are WLS, weighted with the number of inhabitants 1895. All coefficients are BETA-
coefficients (therefore no constant given). P-values in parenthesis. Shading indicates coefficients
significant at a 0.05-level. Sources: See Table 3.
Protestant confession: share of protestants of the entire population (census 1895). Jewish religion:
share of Jewish of the entire population (census 1895).27
Table 5: Regressions of creation rates in Baden 1897-1905
Estimation and
specification
IV OLS OLS OLS, with industry shares























































2 0.40 0.60 0.66 0.44
N4 8 3 73 5 2 5
P-values in parenthesis. Shading indicates statistical significance at a 0.10-level. WLS weighted with
population 1895. Sources: See Table 4. All variables are in logs, branches excluded. Under
“normality” the significance of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests is given. The number of cases is
declining with increasing number of variables because some original values were zero and could not



















































Map 1: Firm creation rates in Baden, 1897-1905
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Map 2: Residual creation rates (agglomeration
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